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THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE DAVID J. BREWER
Wayne Delavan
Henderson State Teachers College
David J. Brewer was born June 20, 1837, in Asia Minor,
of missionary parents who returned to America the next year.
irewer later went to Wesleyan University and graduated fromYale with honors in 1856. His father was also a Yale graduate.
The young man then studied law in the office of an uncle for
a year. He next spent a year at the Albany Law School, grad-
uating in 1858, and was admitted to the New York bar.1He
pent a few months that fall in Kansas before going out to the
Denver region. In June, 1859, he returned to eastern Kansas
and settled at Leavenworth, his home until 1890. 2 The uncle
under whom he had studied law was David Dudley Field,
who was the father of the reformed penal and civil procedural
odes in New York; Field also ran afoul of charges of profes-
ional misconduct in acting as counsel for Jay Gould and
ames Fisk in the Erie Railroad affairs in 1869. 3 He was a
>rother of Cyrus West Field, the businessman of Atlantic
Cable fame . 4 All of this meant, no doubt, that the young
brewer was fullyaware of the views of businessmen of this time.
Brewer was appointed United States Commissioner in
861 and was elected judge of the probate and criminal court
of Leavenworth County the next year. His election to the
udgeship of the first judicial district of Kansas followed in
864. He was city attorney of Leavenworth, 1869-1870, after
eaving the office of district judge. He had been a member of
he local school board and president of it, and, for a while, was
uperintendent of schools in Leavenworth. In 1868 he was the
resident of the Kansas State Teachers Association. In 1870,
t the age of 33, be was elected to the Kansas State Supreme
Court and was re-elected twice. After fourteen years there, he
was elevated by President Arthur to the Federal Circuit Court
or the Eighth Circuit.5
I Then in 1889 Brewer was named to the United Statesupreme Court by President Harrison. Here he was a colleaguef his uncle. Justice Stephen J. Field, until 1898. Stephen J.ield was a brother of Brewer's mother as well as a brother of
rUlen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds. Dictionary of American Biography(21 columes, New York: Scribner's, 1928-1937), III,22.(Ibid.;Hampton Carson, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its His-tory . .. (two parts, Philadelphia: John Y. Huber Co., 1891). II,538.
3DAB, IV, 359-360.
«DAB, VI, 357-359.
sCarson, op. cit.; DAB, III,22. 66
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Philosophy of Justice David J. Brewer
he man under whom Brewer had read law.Field also had visit-
d Turkey as a boy with the parental Brewer family. Another
fustice, Henry B. Brown, was a classmate of Brewer at Yale,
t is thought that Field tried to lead the new justice, who had
similar political, economic, and legal philosophy, but Brewer
efused to follow blindly.6 However, as one would expect from
heir similar views, itappears that as time went along he came
more nearly to reflect his uncle. While on the Supreme Court
>ench, Brewer wrote the court opinion in 526 cases, "70 of
which involved constitutional problems." In 215 cases, Brewer
[issented, writing a separate opinion in 53 of them. Brewer con-
urred 38 times, and wrote 8 separate concurring opinions. 7 By
he time of his death in March, 1910, Brewer ranked third in
ength of service on the Supreme Court. Justice Harlan out-
anked him by a dozen years. Incidentally, Harlan was the
>oon companion of Brewer. 8
One editorial writer wrote after the death of Justice Bre-
wer that, "Politically,Justice Brewer was a strict constructionist
f the Constitution, so far as affected the reserved rights of the
tates. He feared the increased centralization of power in the
lands of the President and Congress." 0 Brewer had been hailed
s a "much better states-rights man than his Southern Demo-
ratic colleague" when he joined the nation's Highest court,
"his was judged from his decisions as Federal circuit judge,
lie South was pleased with Brewer's appointment according
o the same writer.10
Brewer delivered the opinion of the court in Keller v. U.
., 213 U. S. 138. Here, the Federal government was trying to
unish the plaintiffs for harboring an alien in a house of pros-
itution as a violation of federal law regarding immigration of
liens into the United States. Brewer was opposed to allowing
be national government a control over aliens that would come
nder police power, fearing the case might allow Congress to in-
ade state control even more. "We should never forget," wrote
irewer, "the declaration in Texas v. White, .... that 'the
Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
nion, composed of indestructible states'." He also warned that
xaggeration of Federal powers and restriction of state power
will "tend to substitute one consolidated government for the
"DAB, III,22; Carl Brent Swisher, Stephens J. Fields, Craftsman of the
Law (Washington; Brooking Institution, 1930), 438.
'DAB, III,24.
'New York Tribune, March 29, 1910, 1 (col. 4).
""The Death of Justice Brewer" (editorial), The Independent, LXVIII
(1910), 774. .
"»"The Supreme Court" (editorial). The Nation XLIX (18.89). 490.
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present Federal system."" However, was this protection of an
individual stirred by ideas of protection of property rights?
He supported the Federal government against South Caro-
ina's attempt to stop payment of national liquor taxes on liquor
sold by the state of South Carolina. That state had state dis-
pensaries with a legal monopoly of wholesale and retail liquor
These had federal permits and had paid federal taxes until April
1901, when South Carolina protested the payment without
making any request for a refund of previous payments. Dispen-
sers had no interest nor profits in sales: profits went to the
own and county with half going to the state treasury. The
'ederal government had issued 371 stamps in 1901 with onlv
112 going to the state, and 260 to individual who had no
right to sell liquor. Brewer gave the opinion in South Carolina
v. U. S., 199 U. S. 437. Brewer admitted that the federal gov-
rnment could not hinder a state in its governmental function
>y taxation. However, he felt that if the state engaged in a
>usiness that is "of a private nature, that business is not witb-
Irawn from the taxing power of the nation." He noted that
South Carolina had a profit of over a half-million dollars
rom its liquor monopoly in 1901. He feared this profit might
ause South Carolina to take over trade in tobacco, oleomargar-
ne, etc. Then other states would follow, delivering a body blow
o federal revenue tax collections. He feared that those wanting
jublic ownership of public utilities, including the railroads,
would gain by action like that of South Carolina. "Would the
State," he asked, "by taking into possession these public utilit-
es lose its republican form of government?" He pointed out
hat some people even wanted to take over and to manage all
msiness. 18 Interestingly enough, the Justice had been in favor
of transportation systems being owned and operated by the
overnment just as was the postoffice. 13
Justice Brewer was concerned with the centralization of
uthority in Washington, but he was careful to preserve the
national government. A newspaper writer commented that the
ate Justice Brewer made the greatest impression as a U. S. Su-
>reme Court Justice in helping to bring interstate commerce
more directly under national control by interpretation of anti-
rust and interstate commerce laws. At the same time he tried
o preserve the powers of the states that were not "effectively
xercised by them." 14 He was not a strict constructionist for he
upheld the power of a federal court to issue and enforce an in-
nKeller v. U. S.. 213 U. S. 138, 139; 143; 148; 149.
"South Carolina v. U. S., 199 U. S. 437, 438; 447; 454; 463.
"Topeka State Journal, Sept. 6, 1897.
i«"David J. Brewer" (editorial). New York Tribune, March 30, 1910,
p. 6, col. 3. 68
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junction in a labor dispute. 13 But again is this a sense of prop-
erty rights? He wrote this decision with no regard for a lack
of a jury trial or a lack of Congressional legislation to protect
such stoppage of interstate commerce.
Brewer on the Kansas Supreme Court had argued that the
bill of rights clause in the Kansas Constitution for equal and
inalienable natural rights and the statement that all political
power is inherent in the people were limitations on legislative
grant of power; therefore, legislative action in giving counties
the right to issue railroad aid bonds was void in Brewer's opin-
on.ie Brewer held that a federal law prohibiting importation
and migration of aliens under contract to labor in the United
States did not apply to a church in contracting for a British
minister to come to New York to be its pastor. Brewer, in the
J. S. Supreme Court opinion, held that Congress in the law
covering the case had used general terms to prevent loopholes.
3ut he believed this case involving a church was not meant by
Congress to be included; therefore, the Supreme Court refused
o apply the law to this church in New York. Brewer argued
hat this was not the substitution of the will of the judge for
hat of the legislator.17 No doubt he was right in ruling that
"ongress only wanted to prohibit the importation of manual
aborers. But Brewer did not rest here. Was it the son of a mis-
ionary speaking when he wrote that, "But beyond all these
matters no purpose of action against religion can be imputed to
any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious
people." 18 He listed all sorts of religious establishment from the
olonial beginnings including the Delaware test oath. This pious
view becomes important even if mere dictum.
Brewer wrote inBudd v. New York that:
The paternal theory of government is to me odious. The utmost pos-
sible liberty to the individual, and the fullest possible protection to him
and his property, is both the limitation and duty of government. Ifit
may regulate the price of one service, which is not a public service, or
the compensation for the use of one kind of property which is not de-
voted to a public use, why may it not with equal reason regulate the
price of all service, and the compensation to be paid for the use of all
property? and if so 'Looking Backward' is nearer than a dream."
He felt that the police power may not be used to limit la-
bor hours if the work was "as free from all risk as any ordinary
"In Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 577; 599-600.
I6W. F. Dodd, "The Function of a State Constitution," Political ScienceQuarterly, XXX (1915), 207; State ex. rel. St. Joseph « Denver City R.Co. v. Commissioners of Nemaha Co., 7 Kans. 335 (Dassler).'Church of the Holy Trinity v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457, 457; 459; 472."Ibid., 465.
"Budd v. New York. 143 U. S. 517, 551. 69
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employment." 20 Prohibiting one from using his property by a
prohibition of liquor was taking property without compensa-
tion in Brewer's views. Itwas the power to use the property and
not mere title that gave the owner value in the property. The
egislative power did not cover this lowering of the value of pro-
perty without compensation; the Fourteenth Amendment pre-
vented the states from doing this. Denial of the use of property
must be compensated. His views as a circuit judge were to be
over-ruled by the United States Supreme Court in another
case. 21 Railroad rates that did not pay the cost of service were
not enforceable in the power of the states. 22 The fact that the
owners of a business had made it a big one did not give the
government more control over it according to Brewer. The
mblic control over a business was not dependent upon the
extent to which the public was benefited by the business. 23
Brewer, who upheld the Kansas prohibition amendment
and laws (unanimous court decisions) , was opposed to pro-
hibition. "And Ihave yet to be convinced," he wrote, "that
he legislature had the power to prescribe what a citizen shall
at or drink or what medicines he shall take or prevent him fromjrowingor manufacturing that what his judgment approves for
lis own use as food, drink, or medicine." 24 Brewer dissented
rom the majority of the Supreme Court and supported a Mass-
achusetts man who refused to be vaccinated for smallpox as
required by Massachusetts law, claiming protection of the
fourteenth Amendment for his rights. The man claimed that
le had suffered a reaction from a previous vaccination. 23
What Brewer considered arbitrary denial of personal rights
was condemned by the dissenting justice in three cases involving
Chinese who had run afoul of Federal immigration authorities.
n Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 689, Brewer protested
hat it was not due process to punish one for not having a
ertificate in his possession when one can get itonly by arbitrary
and unregulated discretion of any official. He did not think that
t was just to take an alien without a certificate before any
ederal judge without limitation and without provisions for
rolbid., 550; David J. Brewer, "The Legitimate Exercise of the Police Powerin the Protection of Health," Charities and the Commons, XXI (1908),
238; 239; 240.
=»State v. Walruff, 26 Fed. 178, 194; 196; 197; Kansas v. Peter Mugler,
29 Kans. 181 (Dassler) , 194.
*»C. 8 N. W. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 35 Fed. 866, 880; Chicago, St. P., M. 8
O. Ry. Co. v. Becker, et. al. 35 Fed. 883, 885; 886.
saBudd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 550
IiKansas v. Peter Mugler, 29 Kans. 181 (Dassler), 194; Prohibitory Amendment Cases, 24 Kans. 499, 503, 516; Intoxicating Liquor Cases, 25 Kans524 (Randolph), 529; 536.
**Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11. 12; 13; 14; 17; 39 70
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lis getting the white witness he had to have at least to prove
iis innocence or to be punished by banishment. He feared that
his technique as then applied against the widely disliked Chinese
might be used later against other classes of people. Also he ques-
ioned if it were in line with the principles of Christianity.86
InU. S. v.Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, Brewer claimed that
the Chinese detained when entering the United States from
China by way of Canada had been wrongfully held. Five of
these gave their names to immigration officials when they at-
tempted to enter and stated that they were American-born. The
rest remained silent. The inspector then had ruled against afl
of them and told them of their right to appeal to the Secretary
of Commerce and Labor. No appeal was made. But they asked
or a writ of Habeas Corpus. Brewer, dissenting, pointed out
that these men had no provisions to compel attendance of need-
ed witness —a rule not enforced against Anglo-Saxon American
citizens. The worst outlaw, he observed, had this privilege.
The Chinese were kept in quarters, not allowed a lawyer to be-jinwith. Finally, after being denied entry, they were allowed to
iave a lawyer, who could examine but not copy testimony on
which the excluding order was based. Written notice of appeal
)ad to come within two days after the decision. In an appeal,
no new evidence could be presented. The burden of proof rested
upon the Chinese. This harsh and arbitrary treatment, in
brewer's opinion, was destroying traditional Chinese friendship
or America. 27
The last case of these three was U. S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S.
253. Here also no provision was made for witnesses; the accus-
d, if he had little money, could not afford the transfer to
Washington. This was a star chamber proceeding according to
irewer. The Chinese had a court decision stating that he was a
ree-born American citizen. Therefore, the rules allowed the
arrest and deportation of a citizen of the United States by ac-
ion of an administrative official, thus overriding the court
which certified as to his American citizenship. Brewer felt that
Congress in giving control over Chinese persons to the immigra-
tion authorities meant only citizens of China. He thought theSupreme Court decision in this case made it refer to any Chinese,
itizen or alien. This stripped a citizen of all right merely be-
ause of his race.28
Brewer joined in 1892 with Justices Harlan and Field in
O'Neal v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, in supporting the incorpor-
ation theory that the Fourteenth Amendment extended the en-
*«Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698, 732; 738; 739; 740; 741
742-743.
8'U. S. v. Sing Tuck, 194 U. S. 161, 166; 170; 177; 178; 182.
««U. S. v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 264; 268; 269; 274; 279; 280. 71
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tire national Bill of Rights against the states. This had never
received a majority vote of the Court. But Justice Black agreed
in this view inhis dissent, supported by three others in 1947. ao
Brewer in a Kansas case commented that stare decisis is used
jy many legislatures, executives, and courts, but "accumulating
wrong will never be disturbed in its illegallyacquired power if
stare decisis continues in power." Ke complained that the Kansas
Court had used obiter dictum on which to base stare decisis. 31
Brewer did not think that judges were placed in office to
carry out the popular will—not to reflect the passing will of
the masses but to render justice and to determine rights. 32 Neith-
er did he think corporation lawyers would be any less disin-
terested judges because of their former employments. Cases in-
volving corporations, he said, were usually between corpora-
ions; also heads of corporations disliked dishonest judges andjad the welfare of the Republic at heart. The best lawyers, ac-
cording to Justice Brewer, were employed by corporations. 33¦ie felt that it would be a blessing ifhalf of the lawyers were to
quit law; standards should be raised to prevent the unfit from
over-crowding the profession. 31 Brewer's ideal lawyer would be
lonest with the public and with individuals, constantly stud-
ous, having both brains and common sense; and he would be
one who never forgot his citizenship. 35 He predicted that the
awyer by 800 years would be settling many things in inter-
national affairs by law instead of by force as at present; thus
he lawyer would be of ever growing importance in our soc-
ety.36
The Supreme Court in Brewer's opinion must be watched
and criticized by the citizens. He wrote:
It is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored or
helped by being beyond criticism. On the contrary, the life and character
of its justices should be the objects of constant watchfulness by all, and
its judgments subject to the freest criticism. The time is past in the history
of the world when any livingman or body of men can be set on a ped-
29O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 332; 469
aoAdamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 71-72.
siState ex. re. St. Joseph W Denver City R. Co. v. Commissioners of Ne-
maha Co., 7 Kans. 335 (Dassler), 339-340.
32David J. Brewer, "Organized Wealth and the Judiciary," The Independent,
LVII (1904), 302.
aalbid., 303.
34Brewer, "Justice Brewer on Training for the Law," The Review of Reviews,
XII(1895) 584. 585.
asBrewer, "The Ideal Lawyer," The Atlantic Monthly, XCVIII (1906),
598.
selbid., 597. 72
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estal and decorated with a halo. True, many criticisms may be, like their
authors, devoid of good taste, but better all sorts of criticism than no
criticism at all. The moving waters are full of life and health; only in
the still waters is stagnation and death. 3'
One judicial reform Brewer wished to promote was the
limination of the unrestricted right of appeal which caused
elay, allowing the trial court to shift responsibility to the
ppellate courts which prevented them from working at their
?est. Also, too many corporations were appealing every case,
orcing weaker opponents to compromise what was justly
heirs to avoid costly delay. He would have prevented the de-
bated party from appealing at will: the appellate court would
ecidc whether to entertain an appeal or not. The elimination of
his privilege, he believed, would check the habit of lynching.38
"The surest quarantee of the permanency of republican
nstitutions," wrote Brewer in August. 1904, "is the stability,
be long tenure of judicial office." Election of judges did not
eform a man's character or increase his wisdom. He admitted
bat a high-minded judge did not leave politics behind him
when he entered the judgeship; political questions are apt to be
abeled as such where appearing in a case and refused judicial
upport. He approved the tendency of the American people to
efuse to transfer one from judicial to political life as wise: he
wrote, "I firmlybelieve in its wisdom, and should not regret
ven a constitutional amendment forbidding any such trans-
er." 3
° An editorial in the same issue of the magazine in which
brewer's article calling for the elimination of politics from the
udiciary appeared admits that Brewer's plan would be practi-
ally impossible when judges of lower courts are elected to short
erms of office. Also the editorial stated that Brewer wrote
gainst political careers for judges when he knew that Judge
Alton B. Parker was apt to obtain (or had already been select-
d) the Democratic nomination for the Presidency. 40
I Brewer had been mentioned for the United States senator-lipin his home state of Kansas, but he had not been willingto¦y for that honor. 41 Perhaps this principle of separating theolitical career from the judicial career was the reason? Pro-ably not.
3TBrewer, "Government by Injunction," National Corporation Reporter,
XV, 848. .
"Brewer, "Right of Appeal," The Independent. LV (1903), 2547, 2548,
2549.
3oBrewer, "Organized Wealth and the Judiciary," The Independent, LVII
(1904), 301, 302.
4o "Justice Brewer's Suggested Constitutional Amendment." (editorial), The
Independent, LVII(1904), 340.
«New York Tribune, March 29, 1910, p. 4, col. 7.
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Yet Brewer did not hesitate to discuss current problems.
Justice Brewer was the best known of the Supreme Court jus-
tices, 42 being in almost constant demand as an after-dinner
speaker and as a lecturer. 43 He was the only justice who had
?roof copies of his opinions ready for the press, and he only
>riefly announced his conclusion in the court session. 44 Brewer
must not have shunned the public limelight merely because he
was a judge. Furthermore, Brewer was faithful to his religious
duties as well as to his civil ones. Deeply interested in Christ-
an missions, he was for years vice-president of the American
Vlissionary Association as well as a loyal church member. He
was president of the Associated Charities in the National Capi-
al for five years prior to his death. 45 He was greatly interested
n international peace and wrote on international law; he was
resident of the commission set up by Congress in 1895 to
determine the facts in the Venezuela boundary dispute with
Great Britain. He was one of the representatives on the arbitral
ribunal which made the award in 1898, settling that dispute. 40
His last years on the bench must have seen a decay of his
usefulness. President Taft wrote in a letter that
"
'The condition
of the Supreme Court is pitiable, and those old fools hold on
with a tenacity that is most discouraging.'
"
He was referring
o Justices Fuller, Harlan, and Brewer. He reported that
"
'Bre-
wer is so deaf that he can not hear and has got beyond the
>oint of the commonest accuracy in writing his opinion; Brew-
r and Harlan sleep almost through all the arguments.'
"
It was
'
'most discouraging to the active men on the bench,'
"
according
o Taft.47 William Allen White reports that Theodore Roose-
velt wrote to him inNovember, 1908, that Brewer was a strik-
ng example of a judge entirely unfit to occupy the position. 48
White reports that he knew Brewer as a circuit judge and says
irewer "believed in the divine right of plutocracy to rule. He
istrusted the people, and his decisions limited their power when-
ver the question of their power came before the court." 49 Brewer
worked according to White with the methods and morals and
rlbid., March 30, 1910, p. 6, col. 3; "The Death of Justice Brewer"(editoral), The Independent, LXVIII(1910), 773.
KaNew York Tribune, March 29, 1910, p. 1, col. 4.•Ibid.
4s"The Death of Justice Brewer," loc. cit., 773; DAB, III,23.
—DAB, III,23.
('Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, a Bio-graphy (two volumes, New York: Farrar 0 Rinehart, 1939), I, 529.
tWilliam Allen White, Autobiography (New York; MacMillan, 1946)f40.
"Ibid., 359. 74
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manners of his time which leaves something less than desirable. 50
Another writer labeled "Brewer and Peckham, the tough-mind-
ed twins of ultra-conservatism." 51
In summary, Brewer believed strongly that the reserved
power of the states must be preserved to prevent a completely
centralized government inWashington having fullpolice power.
Neither would he approve of state action that could hamstring
he national government. Legislative grant of power, he believed,
was not unlimited. He believed that the enforcement of law
hould be based on the spirit of the law rather than the letter
of it; if necessary, the judge should consider the intent of the
egislature in marginal cases.
His property sense was acute. Title was more important
han how one obtained title. He was opposed to governmental
egulation of a business which had no governmental privilege
granted to it.He felt that if a legislature takes the use of pro-
perty from its owner, society should repay the economic loss to
hat owner. Brewer did not believe that a business should be re-
gulated merely because of its size or because of its public ser-
vice.
Brewer refused to follow majority decisions that took
possible rights to a just and fair trial from helpless Chinese by
he whims of bureaucrats. Discrimination on account of race
or lack of means was not the American way as visualized by
brewer. Also, Brewer insisted that stare decisis was used too of-
en and was freezing bad decisions into a permanent system. The
udge was not the mirror of popular willbut of justice. Corpor-
tion lawyers should not be eliminated from judicial careers
or they numbered some of the best lawyers and would not re-
lect their former employers. Brewer wanted fewer, but more
apable and better trained lawyers.
I Critics were beneficial to the Supreme Court in Brewer'siews. He would have eliminated free use of appeal as too oftenelaying justice.
I The long tenure of judicial office was a safeguard of theation and justice. There was no place for a political career forle judge. Brewer himself apparently avoided a political careerccept as a judge. This did not mean that he was not active inviland religious life.
He seemed to see the religious organizations of Christianity
and of the secular government as having a common bond which
leads to a question of his attitude towards the separation of
church and state.
BOFred Rodell, Nine Men, a Political History of the Supreme Court from
1790 to 1955 (New York: Random House, c. 1955), 187.
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